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IN TRODUCIION 
The purpose of this paper is to report on research that 
was done in an area of manpower development programs in which 
little analysis has been done. During the last decade there 
were many developments in the area of federal manpower programs. 
Two of these developments were the Manpower Development and 
Training Act (MDTA) and the Work Incentive Program (WIN). They 
provide training for new workers as well as retraining for workers 
displaced by technology. This paper will try and show that grad­
uates of the WIN program are financially more successful than those 
of the MOTA program. Also, this paper will test eight variables to 
determine upon what the success of public aid recipients is dependent. 
Chapter I is a brief history of vocational education and 
retraining programs in the United States. The development of, as well 
as the reason for, vocational education and retraining are discussed 
along with a review of the amounts of money spent on vocational edu­
cation. 
Chapter II deals exclusively with the Manpower Development 
and Training Act. First, there is a short history of MIJrA followed 
by a discussion of institutional training and on-the-job training. 
A sununary of the objectives of the MDTA program and a review of MDTA 
studies dealing with the social costs and benefits of MDTA programs 
are also included in this chapter. 
1 
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Chapter III is a summary of the Work Incentive Program. 
In this chapter the history of the WIN program is discussed along 
with the responsibilities of the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare (HEW) and the Department of Labor (DOL) in promoting 
the program. The final section of this chapter outlines new 
changes in the WIN program. 
Chapter IV is concerned with the statement of the hypotheses 
to be tested in this paper and the source and type of data that was 
used in the tests. 
Chapter V is the presentation of the findings�obtained from 
the various statistical tests that were made. 
Chapter VI is the concluding chapter and has some final 
connnents on the findings as well as suggestions for further research. 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORY OF TRAIN ING PROGRAMS 
Vocational Education 
The idea of vocational education has been with us since 
ancient times. Then, it was usually a father-son tradition and 
training was by observation and imitation. When the world began 
to change rapidly, especially after the industrial revolution, 
there was no guarantee that a son would follow his f ather's pro­
f ession, so some system of training was necessary. 
The Morrill Act of 1862 was the first Federal plan to help 
the vocational training system in America. The Morrill Act made 
land grants available to state colleges that were devoted to the 
agricultural and mechanical arts to enable them to provide liberal 
and practical education to the industrial classes. Not until after 
the Civil War were high schools of much importance to vocational 
education. They were strictly college preparatory schools and were 
not necessarily f our-year institutions. When more and better high 
schools came into existence, colleges began upgrading their curricula. 
At this time a college education was comparable to a good present­
day high school education. High schools gradually became four-
year institutions because colleges gradually began upgrading their 
3 
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curricula and demanding four years of high school for admission. As 
the colleges upgraded their studies, high schools had to fill the 
void left in vocational education when colleges moved into highly 
skilled and professional f ields. For example, college courses in 
f arming became agricultural science and mechanical arts became 
engineering. Therefore, high schools began to fill in at the inter­
mediate levels. 
Vocational education bills were passed in Congress every year 
between 1906 and 1913, but none were really satisfactory. The quality 
of American vocational education still lagged behind that of Europe. 
It wasn't until the Commission on N ational Aid to Vocational Education 
was formed in 1914 that a substantial move was made to help vocational 
education. Through the work of this commission came the V ocational 
Education Act of 1917 or the Smith-Hughes Act. This bit of legislation 
was meant to bring American training standards up to those of Europe. 
The Smith-Hughes Act allowed $7 million annually for vocational educa­
tion and this same amount is still allotted today. Prior to 1963 and 
the Vocational Education Act of that year, various other bills added 
$40 million to the yearly sum for vocational education. Total 1963 
Federal appropriations for vocational and technical education were 
over $57 million. 
The goal of vocational education has not been solely to supply 
industry with the amounts and types of skilled labor it needs. Voca­
tional education also helps to eliminate unemployment problems. It 
5 
does this by providing skilled training at the high school level to 
young people who will soon be entering the job market. Because of 
our fast-paced society and neglect of minority groups, however, a 
new unemployment problem has arisen. Some groups of people, especi-
ally the ghetto poor and older workers, cannot obtain good vocational 
education and those already trained are losing their jobs because of 
technological changes in industry. Large numbers of people, there­
fore, are unemployed because they lack appropriate training. 1 
Retraining 
Structural unemployment problems were considered to be national 
problems by Congress in the 1960's. The " Holland Subconunittee on 
Unemployment and Impact of Automation, " a part of the "U. S. Congress 
House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor," confirmed 
that unemployment was the nation's most pressing problem. Even though 
industry, labor and local governments did have employment programs, 
the unemployment problem was too great for them to handle alone. The 
labor market, after all, is a national market and national leadership 
is required to meet its needs. The Holland Subcommittee also said 
that hard-core structural unemployment "appeared to be on the increase." 
With rising unemployment, measures needed to be taken on a nation-wide 
scale. Training and retraining were recognized as essential remedies 
1Facts in the preceding section taken from Grant Venn, Man, 
Education and Work (American Council on Education: Washington, D.C., 
1964), pp. 38-6 1 .  
6 
by the "Joint Economic Committee of Congress." Retraining the unem-
ployed and especially the unemployed on welfare became a nation-wide 
. . 2 priority. 
Retraining for welfare recipients made good sense because 
poverty, welfare and unemployment are closely allied. Welfare 
recipients have social and psychological problems that tend to add 
up causing them to be marginal workers. In March 1 964, one out of 
every four unemployed persons was classified as poor. Members of 
poor families, no matter what the age group, were more likely to be 
unemployed than family members of nonpoor families. Among the heads 
of poor f amilies, unemployment was three times higher than among the 
heads of other families. Family members of poor households where the 
head of the household was unemployed were subject to twice as much 
unempl oyment as the family members of nonpoor households whose head 
was unemployed. 
During the 60's welfare agencies were ineffective in their 
attempts to employ the poor. Employment programs of welfare agencies 
were described by Ida R .  Hoos as "substituting one kind of substandard 
status for another. "  Typical jobs obtained by wel f are recipients, for 
example, motel maid, nurse aid, are actual ly a type of disguised unem-
pl oyment because wages received from these jobs are not enough to meet 
current l iving standards. However, even though the number of welfare 
2Facts and quotations in this paragraph taken f rom Ida R. Hoos, 
Retraining the Work Force (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
Cal ifornia Press, 1967), p. 195. 
7 
cases cancelled was low, and types of work obtained seemed unsatisfac-
tory, intangibles such as self-confidence and experience were gained. 
Many seemingly demeaning jobs were not below the aspiration levels of 
trainees; thus, if the wage levels of these jobs were raised, the 
trainee could have become self-sufficient.
3 
Investment in human capital, such as manpower programs, is the 
reason for declines in poverty in the United States, says D. O. Sewell . 
According to Mr. Sewell, the remaining poverty in the United States is 
present because investment opportunities in human capital have been 
4 
"thwarted." Another reason, however, for lack of investment in human 
capital is less l iquidity. Physical capital can be used as collateral 
and sold if the borrower defaults. However, because the investment in 
human capital will be embodied in the borrower, there is no collateral 
to sell if he defaults because he cannot be sold. For this reason 
investment in human capital must be financed from the resources of the 
investor and his family, which severel y restricts people in the lower 
income brackets. 
Public intervention in the area of investment in human capital 
has been promoted for three reasons. First, it could help improve the 
distribution of resources in the economy and thereby increase national 
income. Secondly, such investment leads to " externa1 1 5 benefits for 
3
Ibid. 
4 . 
D. O. Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program (Kingston, Ontario: 
Queen's University, 1971), p. 1 .  
5 
External benefits would be any benefits resulting from the 
increased income and standard of living of the people receiving publ ic 
funds. 
8 
society as well as benefits for the individual. The third reason for 
increased interest in investment in human capital is that even though 
people feel there should be a more equal redistribution of income, 
it goes against the "Protestant Ethic" to merely give people money. 
This idea is reflected in the executive programs from the "War on 
Poverty" of the Johnson Administration up to and including Nixon's 
"Workfare" or Familiy Assistance Plan. It is easy to see why programs 
of education and vocational training which have a potential for 
bettering a person's earning ability are so important when the 
objective is to change people from poor to nonpoor "through their 
own efforts.116 
Retraining is different from normal vocational training. 
Retraining grows out of a need at a certain place and time. Voca-
tional training is more 9r less permanent while retraining programs 
are discontinued when their purpose is fulfilled. 7 
The Area Redevelopment Act (ARA) of 1961 was the beginning of 
employability programs. The ARA was enacted under pressure of mount-
ing technological job dislocations. Over $4.5 million was authorized 
under this act for vocational training of unemployed or underemployed 
persons in specific "redevelopment areas." The ARA was of limited import-
ance, however, because funds were limited to "redevelopment areas," 
6Quotations in this paragraph taken from Sewell, Training the 
Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Manpower Programs in the U . S. Anti­
poverty Program (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, 1971), p. 3-4. 
7 
Einar Hardin and Michael E. Borus, The Economic Benefits and 
Costs of Retraining (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 
1 971) ' p. 3 .  
9 
and support allowances were limited to only sixteen weeks.8 The 
Community Work and Training Program (CWf) of 1962 was the beginning 
of nation-wide employability programs.9 The cwr program was optional 
for the states. Federal funds were not supplied directly, but it was 
the beginning of Federal involvement in welfare recipients employability 
problems. 
8
Grant Venn, Man, Education and Work (American Council on 
Education: Washington, D .  C ., 1964), p. 119. 
9Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN Phase II; County 
Department Manual (Springfield, Illinois, 1971), p. 5. 
CHAPTER II 
MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ACT 
History of MDTA 
The Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 was 
next in the line of Federal employability programs and grew to be 
bigger and more complex than either AR.A or CWT and quickly absorbed 
them. The MDTA courses could be established in all labor markets 
and they could last up to fifty-two weeks. 10 The original MDTA act 
was comprised of three titles. 11 Titles II and III were to last 
three years. Title I was permanent and made the Secretary of Labor 
responsible to the President for an annual report. The Secretary's 
report was to cover "l abor market balances and imbalances, impact of 
automation and technology and the occupational structure of the work 
force. "  Title II concerns the unemployed and underemployed with pro-
visions that included those sixteen to twenty-two years ol d but only 
those nineteen to twenty-two years old were eligible for training 
allowances. Skill surveys and analyses of supply and demand were 
also part of this act. Title III states that the Secretary of Labor 
lOHardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of 
Retraining, p. 6 .  
11Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 1 97 .  
1 0  
11 
must make reports to Congress of MDTA's progress. More important, 
the Secretary of Labor was given the power to enter into agreements 
with qualified groups to start on-the-job training programs. 
December 1 96 3  amendments to MDTA broadened youth-training 
allowances and authorized special retraining cl asses for them, plus 
relaxing some requirements for adults as to how much they could earn 
during training and raised the training all owances. Also, the 1963 
amendments permitted training of the f unctionall y il literate. 12 
Furthermore, the 1963 amendments authorized payment of allowances 
over a greater length of time so trainees could obtain minimal edu-
cational skill s. 13 
The Manpower Act of 1965 increased allowances again and . 
allowed reimbursements for corrnnuting costs. In 1 965 MDTA obtained 
permanent and f iscal stabil ity and officially absorbed the ARA.14 
New amendments in 1 966 added special courses for older workers, 
increased emphasis on hard-core unemployed and experimental courses 
for inmates of correctional institutions. The 1968 amendments 
extended retraining programs until 1 972  and called for use of man-
t . . k"ll 15 power raining s i centers. 
12irardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of 
Retraining, p. 7 .  
1 3  Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 202 . 
14ttardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of 
Retraining, p. 7 .  
l5 Ibid. 
12 
Locally, MOT A revolves around the public employment office 
and the vocational school system. In starting MDT A programs, the 
employment office first determines what occupations are in need of 
16 
new employees and makes referrals to training courses. They then 
pay the trainee's training and subsistance allowances and provide 
job development, placement and follow-up services. Recognizing the 
need for income maintenance was a first for MDT A.1 7  Also, experience 
and family status were introduced by MDTA as criteria for eligibility. 18 
The MDTA was the beginning of a "partnership" between the U.S. Depart­
ment of Labor and the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare;19 
The role of HEW in MDTA programs is to provide training facilities 
and instructors, develop training curricula and methods, and evaluate 
the progress of the trainees. Welfare agencies have had their powers 
taken away from them in manpower fields. 20 This was done for two 
reasons. First, Congress did not like the progress of the programs 
started under 1962 legislation and the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act 
that were run entirely by welfare agencies. Secondly, Congress 
wanted all manpower programs run by the same agency. There was some 
16  
Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p .  197 . 
17 Ibid . , p. 198. 
18
aardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of 
Retraining, p. 7. 
19 Hoos, Retraining the Work Force,p. 197 . 
20Weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed. ,  Manpower, p. 146 
13 
discontent over this change because some people thought that only 
welfare personnel could really handle and deal with welfare recipi-
ents and their problems; that strictly focusing on employment was 
not good; and finally, that welfare recipients would have to deal 
with still another set of counselors.21 
Financing of MDTA 
In August of 1962 the first funds were allocated to MOTA and 
amounted to $161,865,353. By 1965, the total amount allocated to 
MOTA was over $650 million. During 1964 and 1965 half of the funds 
went to training allowances and the rest went to costs of equipment 
rental, supplies and teachers'  salaries. Distribution of funds 
between states was uneven, however. Sixteen states accounted for 71 
percent of all the money allocated to MDTA. By 1966, 450,000 persons 
had been approved for occupational training. Of this number, 387,000 
were institutional and 62,000 were enrolled in on-the-job training. 
22 By 1965, 600 specific areas were covered in MDTA training programs. 
The MOTA was originally created to retrain heads of house-
holds who were experienced but displaced because of technological and 
23 economic change. Besides helping the displaced, long-term employed 
21Ibid. 
22 Facts about MDTA in this paragraph taken from, Hoos, 
Retraining the Work Force, p. 201. 
23 Garth L. Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower 
Development and Training (a Joint Publication , Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan, Detroit : Wayne State University, and 
Washington, D. C.: National Manpower Policy Task Force, 1967), 
p. 7. 
14 
adult, MDTA has tried to help with other problems, such as the school 
dropout and the competitively disadvantaged. However, it has not met 
the need of the economy. It is called a "Band-Aid" program because 
it is remedial in nature, reaching only those that the education system 
cannot.24 The MDTA has succeeded onl y in helping the better-prepared 
poor, those with an education past the eighth grade and the more moti-
vated. It has not helped those with eighth grade education or less, 
older workers, rural unemployed and underemployed and the ghetto poor. 
In the beginning empl oyment service interviewers chose onl y those 
applicants with the most potential to refer to training programs. 
"Creaming" was done to give MDTA a good name so it could be expanded. 25 
Garth L. Mangum points out that many at the local l evel complained 
that MDTA was becoming "just another poverty program.1126 Local offi-
cials would settl e for meeting labor shortages and upgrading the l abor 
f orce. They hoped the disadvantaged would be included in the total 
population served. 
The Act originated a new procedure in the area of training. 
All training classes were to be newly developed, and no one could be 
27 referred to an already existing course. These new training course 
requirements of MDTA were good in principle because they allowed far 
more personalized training programs. They did not work in fact, 
24
Ibid. ,  p .  7 3 .  
25 
Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 202. 
26 Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower Development and 
Training, p .  7 .  
27Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 198. 
15 
however, because there was no way to be sure a training program 
28 produced everything it was supposed to produce. 
Institutional and OJT Training 
Although institutional training was found to be better than 
on-the-job training (OJT) for particular occupations, OJT was better 
. 29 in an overall comparison. Earnings levels of institutionally-trained 
men were greater than o.rr-trained men, but because costs of institu-
tional training were higher than o.rr, the cost-benefit ratios for 
OJT were better. 3 0  On-the-job training also proved to be the best 
training program as well as the �est overall program for women. 31 
Mangum suggests expanding the OJT programs and making sure that new 
slots go to those that employers would not otherwise hire. 3 2  On-the-
job training is ad ministered by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau 
of Apprenticeship and Training to try and gain labor's trust. 33 Organ-
ized labor was originally against OJT because they felt that the supply 
of skilled labor was adequate, and an oversupply would force wages 
34 
down. Private employers were against OJT originall y because they 
28Ihid. 
29sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. 1 09 .  
3 0ibid. 
31 
b. d 108 !.....!_., P· . 
32Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower Development and 
Training, p. 85. 
33Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, p. 200. 
34Ibid. 
r 
\ I 
16 
were afraid of the governmental control needed to make it work.
35 
Vocational educators also objected to OJT because they said it was 
36 
an intrusion of the Secretary of Labor into the field of education. 
On-th-job training has benefits that institutional training does 
37 not have. On the average, OJT results in larger increases in 
average earnings levels. In spite of the objections to it, OJT was 
supposed to be the major method of retraining for those threatened 
by skill obsolescence or less-than-full time work. But because of 
the ease of starting institutional training, OJT was neglected 
38 during the beginning of MDTA and also during subsequent years. 
Objectives of MDTA 
Certain potential and identi fiable objectives of MDTA can be 
outlined as follows : 
(1) Facilitating employment o f  the unemployed; 
(2) Reducing poverty; 
(3) Lessening inflationary pressures; 
(4) Meeting labor shortage; 
(5) Upgrading the labor force; 
(6) Revamping traditional institutions.
3 9 
35Ibid. 
36rbid. 
37 Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit Cost Analysis of 
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. 109. 
38 Hoos, Retraining the Work Force, pp. 199-200. 
3 9 Mangum, Contributions and Costs of Manpower Development and 
Training , p. 7. 
17 
Objective number five, however, has never become a specific objective 
in practice. Keeping these objectives in mind, we can see four policy 
questions that must be answered in determining the future of the MDTA 
program. They are as follows: 
(1) Should the program objectives emphasize upgrading 
the labor force or rehabilitating the disadvantaged; 
(2) What are the relative advantages and what should be 
the balance between insti tutional training and OJT; 
(3) What should be the relative federal and state roles 
in policy and operation; 
(4) Is a permanent program needed and what should be its 
nature and size?40 
Review of MDTA Studies 
Various surveys and s tudies have been done to try and answer 
some or all of the above questions. For example, a survey by Ribich 
and the Institute for Defense Analysis shows that expenditures for 
vocational training do more to increase earnings potential of the 
poor than does general education. 41 Many social benefit-cost analyses 
have been done to shed some light on training programs. 
In West Virginia, Cain and S tromsdorfer studied men and women 
graduates of an MDTA training program.42 Net present value or benefit 
of training over a ten-year period, using both ten p ercent and five 
percent discount rates, were calculated and compared to the costs for 
40
Ibid. 
41 
Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. S. 
42Einar Hardin , "Benefit-Cost Analysis of Occupational Training 
Programs: A Comparison of Recent Studies," in Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Manpower Policies, ed. by G .  G .  Somers and W .  D. Wood (Queen ' s  Univer­
sity at Kingston, Ontario : Industrial Relations Centre, 1969), p. 112. 
18 
men, women, and the average graduate using the ten percent discount 
rate. Using the five percent discount rate gave $3, 985 for men, $80 
for women and $1, 990 for the average graduate. Costs per trainee 
were $918 for a man, $526 for a woman and $787 for the average grad-
uate. Cain and Stromsdorfer report benefit-cost ratios of 10.5 for 
men, 2.7 for women and 9.3 for the average graduate. 
Stromsdorfer, using the same data but different analysis tech­
niques, obtained economic benefits of $828 for men and $336 for women.43 
These figures, according to Stromsdorfer, remained constant for the 
entire service life of the trainee. Using the above cost estimates, 
Stromsdorfer calculated rates of return of 90 percent for men and 64 
percent for women, but did not give any benefit-cost ratios. 
In Michigan, Hardin and Borus studied institutionally and 
occupationally-oriented training pr�grams.44 The study was designed 
to measure effects of training on (1) national product, (2) disposable 
income of trainees, and (3) government outlays and receipts. The 
Borus and Hardin study is the only study to make estimates on what 
impact class length had on results of training. They· dete�mined .that 
class length did have an effect on benefit-cost ratios. Their findings 
showed that short courses had better benefit-cost ratios than did long 
courses. Using discount rates of ten percent and four pereent with a 
service life of ten years, short class benefit-cost ratios were 4.2 
and 5.5 respectively, while benefit-cost ratios for long classes 
43�. 
44rbid., pp. 113-116. 
19 
were small or negative. Additional training did not increase 
earnings enough to offset large increases in costs of longer 
training courses. The overall benefit-cost ratio for Michigan 
was 1.2 using a ten-year service life and a ten percent discount 
rate. 
After reweighing in accordance with the estimated composi-
tion of Michigan training according to course duration, Hardin and 
Borus get an increase in the benefit-cost ratio of 1. 5 .  As a con-
clusion to their study, Hardin and Borus made several recommendations 
for future training programs: 
(1) Continue occupational training of adult workers. 
(2) Emphasize short classes rather than long ones. 
(3) Expand training in sub-groups, e.g. , race, sex, 
education. 
(4) Spend more money on short courses for women, whites, 
those with few years of schooling, low earners, 
welfare recipients, health care and miscellaneous 
sales and service occupations rather than on factory 
or auto repair occupations. 
(5) Contract medium or long training courses regardless 
of other considerations.45 
These recorranendations would also hold for training programs in other 
states say the authors. Finally, the authors feel that even though 
there have been changes in tax rates, training allowances, organiza-
tion and administration or programs, they believe the basic relation-
ships are the same today. They also think that the introduction of 
45 Hardin and Borus, The Economic Benefits and Costs of 
Retraining, pp. 188-190. 
20 
on-the-job training and other types of new training techniques will 
not make their findings obsolete because institutional training is 
still a major part of MDTA. 
In another benefit-cost study done by Borus in Connecticut, 
he used several different assumptions concerning the use of skills 
learned in the courses to calculate a broad range of ratios. Benefit-
cost ratios were then calculated using a five percent discount rate and 
a ten-year service life, adjusted for out-migration from the training-
related occupation, and were found to range from 73.3 to 137.3 {_§j£). 
Short classes were found to be more attractive to the trainees because 
46 
they required less capital investment by the trainees. 
In Massachusetts, Page studied 907 trainees and computed benefit-
cost ratios for them. Using a ten percent discount rate and a 35-year 
service life, he obtained a ratio of 6.2.47 
Einar Hardin attempts to put all the studies on a comparable 
basis. To do this he makes three assumptions: 
(1) The annual benefits in the first year after 
training remain unchanged for a total of ten 
years then become zero; 
(2) Social discount rate used is ten percent; 
(3) Social gains estimated as differences in earnings 
between trainees and non-trainees, disregard�gg vacuum, displacement and multiplier effects. 
46Hardin, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Occupational Training 
Programs: A Comparison of Recent Studies, p. 112. 
47Ibid. 
48vacuum effect: job vacancy left when a worker moves to a 
new job; Displacement effect: new workers taking jobs of older workers; 
Multiplier effect: new jobs resulting from the filling of one job 
vacancy. Ibid., pp. 113-114. 
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Two alternative assumptions were used to make Borus' results compar-
able. Alternative I was trainees who use training gain $500; those 
who .do..:not::ua� training gain nothing, and the probability of a trainee 
using training is 0.67, thus benefits to society annually will be 
$335. Alternative II was that there is a 0.67 chance that an enrollee 
will use training; only graduates are assumed to use training; the 
dropout rate is ten percent; and the social cost of training is $346, 
which was taken from Hardin and Borus ' study for short classes. 
Earnings data for non-trainees and dropouts comes from Borus ' study. 
Tab.Le I shows the results. 49 
Sewell believes that the increase in salaries obtained by 
trainees over non-trainees may have been due to the job placement 
efforts of MDTA officials and not due to the training, because MDTA 
50 officials are obligated to find jobs for completers. He also feels 
that women brought the rating of institutional training down because 
they lacked motivation.51 
According to Sewell, if the objective of training is to raise 
the earnings level of women, they should go to OJT, because if they 
participate, it can be assured they are committed to the labor force 
more so than women who undertake institutional training. 
49
Hardin, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Occupational Training 
Programs : A Comparison of Recent Studies, p. 113. 
50 Sewell, Training the Poor; A Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Manpower Programs in the U.S. Antipoverty Program, p. 108. 
51!Eil., p. 109. 
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TABLE 1 
ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR SOCIETY 
ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION OF RESULTsa 
Annual 
Author Annual Initial Benefits 
And Benefits Cost Per In Percent 
Group Per Trainee Trainee Of Cost 
Cain and 
Stromsdorfer 
Men $1,008 $ 918 108.8 
Women 192 527 36.4 
Both Sexes 736 787 93.5 
Stromsdorfer 
Men 828 918 90.2 
Women 336 527 63.8 
Hardin and 
Borus 
60-200 Hours 976 346 282.1 
201-1,920 Hours -57 1,665 -3.4 
All Course 
Lengths 251 1, 27 2 19.7 
Reweightedb 316 1,289 24.5 
Borus 
Alternative I 335 (346) ( 96. 8) 
Alternative II 818 (346) (236 .4) 
Page 4.46 698 63.9 
Benefits 
Costs 
6.7 
2.2 
5.7 
5.5 
3.9 
17.3 
( -0. 2) 
1.2 
1. 5 
(5. 9) 
(14. 5) 
3. 9  
aBased on a discount rate·of 10 percent and a 10-year 
service life. 
bWeights based on the estimated distribution of Michigan 
trainees according to course length (60-200, 201-600, 601-1200 and 
1,201-1920 hours. 
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Because of procedures used to select only the best applicants 
for training (referred to as creaming), only those most likely to 
succeed were chosen for MDTA projects. Thus, conclusions drawn from 
these benefit-cost analyses are of limited interest to anti-poverty 
52 programs. Also, Sewell feels that past benefit-cost analyses are 
suspect as far as making policy decisions from them because data 
used in the analyses were taken from time periods before substantial 
changes were made in the programs.53 
52Ibid., p. 7. 
53Ibid., p. 6-7. 
CHAPTER III 
WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
History of WIN 
The most recent retraining program for welfare recipients 
came about in 1967 as a result of congressional amendments to the 
Social Security Act. The new program was called the Work Incentive 
Program (WIN) .S4 The WIN program developed from a number of differ­
ent approaches to training and employing public aid recipients.SS 
Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 outlined the basic 
program that is part of the WIN program. Congress enacted Law 90-
248 on January 2, 1968 called the 111967 Amendments to the SSA" which 
established the Work Incentive Program.S6 The Work Incentive Program 
is the most ambitious plan for rehabilitating and employing welfare 
recipients in the history of the AFDcS7 program.SB The bill creating 
the WIN program did not meet with unanimous acceptance when it was 
passed. The "thirty and a �third" provision, for example, was more 
54Arnold Wieber, Frank Cassell and Woodrow L. Ginsburg, ed., 
Public-Private Manpower Policies (Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial 
Relations Research Association, 196 9), p. 14S. 
55Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN, p. S. 
S6Ibid., p. 7. 
57Aid to Families of Dependent Children. 
58weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed., Public-Private Manpower 
Policies, p. 14S. 
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5 9  liberal than the president had asked for in his original request. 
He had asked for only a $50 exemption per family. The House 
committee studying the WIN program in 1 967 said that WIN should 
reverse the trend of increasing welfare roles, although it would 
be costly at first. In fiscal 1969 the $30 incentive payment cost 
$129 million and the "thirty and a third" provision cost $20 million. 
The Senate agreed that the bill was needed but changed it 
substantially. The bill then went to conference where it was put 
into its final form. Wilbur Mills (D. A�k.), chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee, said he was very much in favor of the bill 
because it was a change from the dole system.60 In the Senate, on 
the other hand, liberals were against the bill. They disagreed with 
provisions in the public assistance section agreed to by the con-
ferees. Fred R. Harris (D. Okla.) , threatened to lead a filibuster 
to put off action until early 1968. The liberals were outmaneuvered 
61 on December 14th and the bill passed. 
Emphasis in the WIN program is on moving recipients from the 
62 welfare roles into self-support. The Work Incentive Program intro-
duced, for the first time, incentives to participate and accept 
59congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. VXXIII (Washington, 
D. Co: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1 967, pp. 902-903. 
60Ibid., p. 909. 
61 
Ibid., p. 913 
62weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed., Public-Private Manpower 
Policies, p. 149. 
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employment. Incentives included $30 cash payments monthly and a 
thirty and a third income disregard feature.63 The WIN program 
also provided sanctions for those who were supposed to partici-
pate but did not. Manpower services are more extensive for the 
64 WIN program than for MDTA because the people trained will need 
more help since they are more disadvantaged. Most WIN trainees, 
though, will end up in the same type of programs as MDTA trainees.65 
Leonard J. Hausman does not believe WIN will achieve fantastic 
results. He does believe, however, that it will make trainees more 
employable. Hausman feels that some WIN graduates will earn more 
than MDTA graduates because of "novel" training programs, like the 
"New Careers" program, preparing them for highly paid sub-profes­
sional jobs and highly paid OJT programs.66 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and Department of 
Labor (DOL) responsibilities 
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare is responsible 
for pre-referral supportive services, training expenses and continuing 
social services while DOL is the program agent. The Department of 
Labor is responsible for manpower and employment services, which are 
63Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN, p. 7. 
64 Weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, eds., Public-Private Manpower 
Policies, p. 149. 
65!.lli.· 
66 
Ibid. 
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education, training, placement and follow-up; but because of the 
relationship between HEW and DOL, few opportunities for partici-
pants, and deficiencies in the preparation and activities within 
the program itself, the movement from AFDC to WIN to employment 
has not been smooth. 
The WIN program prior to 1 971 was disappointing because 
there were fewer than expected placements, a low reduction in grant 
levels due to employment, and a low reduction in AFDC recipients. 6
7 
New Changes in WIN 
To correct WIN deficiencies, Senator Talmadge introduced the 
68 
1971 amendments that became Public Law 72-223 on December 28, 1971. 
The amendments introduce an important change by requiring inter-agency 
participation in both planning and operational functions. The "new" 
WIN program relies very strongly on cooperation between agencies. 
Highlights of the 1 971 amendments are listed in Tabl� 2.69 
Congress increased emphasis on employment by mandating parti-
cipation in areas where there were significant numbers of AFDC recipi-
70 
ents. New to manpower programs is the opportunity for AFDC mothers 
to participate.71 The treatment of mothers in the WIN program is 
67Illinois Department of Public Aid, WIN, p. 7. 
68 Ibid., p. 8. 
69 Ibid. 
70Ibid., p. 7. 
71weber, Cassell and Ginsburg, ed., Public-Private Manpower 
Policies, p. 148. 
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TABLE 2 
HIGHLIGHTS OF 1971 AMENDMENTS 
(1) Insure that welfare recipients are provided the services they 
need, including child care, to participate effectively in the 
Work Incentive Program. 
(2) Emphasize employment-based rather than institutional training 
under the program. 
(3) Relate institutional training much more closely to actual jobs 
available. 
(4) Set priorities for participation in the Work Incentive Program, 
giving high priority to mothers who volunteer to participate in 
the program. 
(5) Ease the fiscal burden on the states by increasing Federal 
matching from 80 to 90 percent for expenses under the Work 
Incentive Program and from 75 to 90 percent for child care, 
family planning, and other services needed to permit an 
individual to participate in the WI N  program. Often, states 
will be able to put up their entire 10 percent matching in 
kind, so this increase in the matching percent should enable 
them to make significant progress in developing these needed 
services. 
(6) Institute an orderly registration procedure for participation 
in the WIN program and make a number of other changes to improve 
the operation of the program. 
handled locally but is similar to the treatment they normally receive. 
The most important asset to the WIN program is the opportunity for 
local administrators to carry it . .
. 
out. 72 
72Ibid., p. 147. 
CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESES AND DA TA 
Hypotheses 
At first it would seem that the MDTA program would provide a 
welfare recipient with the best chance to become self-sufficient, if 
for no other reason than the MDTA program's being much more mature 
than the WIN program. The MDTA program has been around long enough 
to have established firm lines of communication between program 
officials, Washington, public aid agencies and the community. Like­
wise, the MDTA personnel should be well acquainted with the program 
and its complexities. From attractive benefit-cost ratios, presented 
in an earlier part of this paper, we have seen that the MDTA program 
has produced desirable results. 
The WIN program is relatively new to the continuum of man­
power programs emanating from Washington. Its newness should not 
hinder it, however, because its designers used the best parts of 
previous programs, as well as some new thoughts, in their attempt 
to make a successful manpower program. There are two main reasons, 
besides its formidable heritage, why the WIN program should produce 
better results for welfare recipients than the MOTA program. First, 
the WIN program is solely for those on public aid; secondly, i t  is 
a novel use of a team of counselors to help the public aid trainee. 
29 
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Possibly the biggest asset this program has is the use of the team 
approach in providing services to the WIN participants. Each team 
is composed of five members, each with a specific duty to perform 
to help the public aid recipient in overcoming any barriers in his 
movement to self-sufficiency. The members of a WIN team are a 
manpower specialist, coach, counselor, work training specialist and 
team clerk. A member of this team unique to manpower programs is 
the coach. He i s  a resident of the local community, and his func­
tion is to see that the trainee adjusts to the little, and sometimes 
overlooked, obstacles to becoming work-oriented. 
Because the WIN program is specifically a welfare recipient 
program and because of its unique team approach, it seems reasonable 
to believe that it would provide a welfare recipient with the best 
chance of successfully obtaining work and being better off financi­
ally than he would have been if he was solely dependent on public aid. 
This paper will test the hypothesis that the WIN program produces 
public aid recipient graduates who are financially more successful 
than public aid recipients who graduate from the MDTA program. 
Success for the purposes of this paper was measured by the ratio of 
income received from employment after completing training, compared 
to the public aid income the trainee would have received if he was 
solely dependent on public aid. Also, the hypothesis will be tested 
that success is dependent on a trainee ' s  age, number of dependents, 
number of years he receive� public assistance before entering training, 
number of years of work experience he had before entering training , 
his marital status, race, sex, and finally, which program he_; completed. 
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Data for this analysis was gathered from Illinois Department 
of Public Aid case records from St. Clair County in Southern Illinois. 
Two hundred cases were picked at random from WIN and M.DTA files, 100 
from each program. To eliminate the possible effect of changing 
unemployment rates in the county, only trainees completing training 
in 1968 and 1969 were chosen for use in this study. By doing this, 
all trainees chosen faced approximately the same unemployment rates 
when they entered the job market. All the names of trainees com­
pleting WIN training in 1968 and 1969 were placed on similar-sized 
slips of paper and placed in a container. The sample was chosen by 
drawing 100 names from the container. The same method was used to 
select the MIYl'A sample. 
In order to investigate the above hypothesis , a measure of a 
welfare recipient ' s  success, a fter completing training in either of  
the two manpower programs studied, was needed. To meet this need a 
ratio was devised that compares total income of a trainee after 
training to total income a trainee would receive if he were totally 
dependent on welfare for his income. This is a logical estimate of 
success because it measures how much better off financially a person 
is by working than by receiving public aid. A man would not be likely 
to take a job that paid less than what he could make on public aid 
because of the 100 percent tax rate on his earnings, and a woman would 
always be better off working because of the less than 100 percent tax 
rate on her earnings. The expected ratios for those obtaining jobs 
should be greater than one. A ratio of one means that the tra inee did 
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not obtain a job and was still receiving public aid. Unexpectedly ,  
there were ratios less than one. This is impossible to explain 
without interviewing the individuals involved. Possibly, pride in 
73 working for a living or case worker error was involved. 
7 3•ro lighten their work loads some caseworkers will cancel 
male cases rather than explain consequences and alternatives to them 
and cancel female cases without explaining thirty and a third benefits. 
CHAPTER V 
INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
Test of First Hypothesis 
A one-way analysis of variance was used to determine if 
there was a statistically significant difference between the WIN 
trainees ' success ratios and the MDTA trainees ' success ratios. 
The F ratio computed was 0 .58 and was not significant at any 
level tested. 74 This means that there is no statistically signi-
ficant difference between the success ratios of the two programs 
and, therefore, no difference between the success of WIN trainees 
and MDTA trainees. My hypothesis must then be rejected. It is 
interesting to note that the MDTA program not only placed more 
people in this sample in jobs--31 as compared to 28 for WIN--but 
also placed three trainees in jobs that resulted in success ratios 
less than one while WIN placed only two in such jobs. These, how-
ever, are not statistically significant differences. 
Test of Second Hypothesis 
To examine what factors affect the success of a WIN or MDTA 
program trainee that completes training, variables were chosen that 
74 0. 5 percent, l percent, 2 . 5  percent and 5 percent levels 
used throughout study. 
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were thought to have a strong influence on these people. Stepwise 
linear regression analysis was used to determine the effect of these 
variables on the success of the sample of trainees used previously. 
The success ratio mentioned earlier was used as the dependent vari­
able. The success ratio of a trainee is thought to be dependent on 
trainee ' s  age (A) ,  number of  dependents (D) , the number o f  years a 
trainee receives public assistance before entering training (Y) , 
number of  years of  work experience the trainee had before entering 
training (W), the trainee ' s  marital status (M) , his race (R) , his 
sex (S), and finally, which program the trainee completed (C). 
The last five variables were treated as dummy variables. A 
one-way analysis of variance was made for each variable to determine 
if there was a statistically significant difference between the 
sample drawn from WIN and that drawn from MDTA for that variable. 
Two variables were determined to have significant differences between 
the sample populations. The first was previous employment history 
with an F ratio of 1 0 .05 and was significant at all levels tested. 
The second was sex with an F ratio of 14.45 also significant at all 
levels tested. 
It is interesting to note that the WIN program trainees 
averaged more work experience than the MDTA program trainees. Since 
data was taken from the beginning of the WIN program's life, it is 
reminiscent of  criticisms of MDTA in its infancy. The point could 
be made that WIN was involved in "creaming", and if it had actually 
lived up to its philosophies, it would not have fared as well as it 
;3 5  
did i n  this test. Of cour s e ,  from the data p r e s ented here ,  there 
is no way of c onfirming that the WIN officials we r e  "creaming. 1 1  
The s econd variable with a statistically s ignificant diffe r -
ence between samples tested was sex. The MDTA program, it 
s e e m s ,  had a substantially higher number of women than did the 
WIN program. In the sample used here, 5 9 ,  or over half, of 
MDTA trainees were women, while only 33 trainees were women in 
the WIN sample. The reason for this is twofold. First,  all able -
bodied men receiving a s s istance and classified as the father or head 
of the family must, by law, be referred to WIN; and secondly, 
women have difficulty finding child care that WIN officials feel is 
adequate. T o  be referred to MDTA there are no child care require -
ments that must be met, but there are r ather strict requirements 
for child care that must be met before a woman with children can be 
referred to WIN. 
Taking note of the above differences between the populations , 
the actual tes ting of the hypothe s i s  gave totally unexpected r e sults . 
( Shown here with the expected signs of the variables in parenth e s e s . ) 
s .  R. = f� ( -) ,  D( - ) ,  Y ( - ) ,  W ( + ) ,  M ( + ) ,  R ( + ) ,  S( - ) , C (+D 
A - Age 
D - Number of dependents 
Y - Number of years a trainee r e c eived public a s s istance 
before entering training 
W - Number of years of work experience the trainee had 
before entering training 
M - Marital status 
R - Race 
S - Sex 
C - Program trainee completed 
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The first variable introduced was public aid history (Y) and its 1 
test was significant at the five percent level. However , the F 
ratio for the equation was not significant at any levels tested. 
Public aid history continued to be significant at the five percent 
level up to and including step four, but none of the additional 
variables were significant at the levels tested, and likewise, the 
F ratios for all remaining equations were not significant. A final 
observation in this analysis is that race was not entered into the 
computation . Its F level to enter was below the pre-set level pro­
vided for in the computer program. Therefore, this hypothesis must 
also be rejected. 
The data collected lent itself to two more tests that were 
done out of curiosity. First, the hypothesis was tested that white 
trainees were more successful than black trainees. The success ratios 
for those obtaining jobs were d ivided into two groups by race. A one­
way analysis of variance was used to determine if there was a differ­
ence. The computed F ratio was 0 .04 and was not significant at any 
level tested, meaning that there was no discrimination because of 
race in this sample. Second, the hypothesis that men are more success­
ful than women was tested. As before, those obtaining jobs were divided 
into two groups, this time by sex. Again, a one-way analysis of vari­
ance was used to determine if there was a difference between the two 
groups. The F ratio was 1 .40 and was not significant at any level 
tested. This hypothesis must also be rejected since there were no 
differences between the success of men and women. 
Please refer to Appendix for complete results. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
Final Conunents 
The interpretation of the data in Chapter V led to the 
rejection of both major hypotheses tested in this paper. This 
means that graduates of the WIN program were not more successful 
financially than graduates of the MDTA program as was expected. 
There could be at least two reasons for this to occur. First, 
the team approach used by WIN is not really a better way to treat 
welfare recipients, or secondly, the number of highly skilled and 
high-paying jobs that WIN graduates were qualified for were few, 
and admission to them closed to welfare recipients . Graduates of 
WIN, then, had to compete with MDTA graduates for jobs that both 
were equally qualified for, and, thus, superior training programs 
made little difference. Further tests would have to be condu cted 
to determine the true reason why the WIN program graduates were not 
more successful than MDTA graduates. 
The rejection of the second hypothesis is equally difficult 
to explain. The eight independent variables used were chosen because 
it was thought that they would exert a strong influence on the trainee ' s  
motivation. Statistically, at least, no strong influence was present. 
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The insignificance of the variable representing the program which 
the trainee completed did support the findings in the test of the 
first hypothesis although there was no di fference in success achieved 
by either WIN or MDTA graduates. Again, however, it is impossible to 
tell why there was no difference between the two programs. The other 
variables and why they did not contribute to the trainee ' s  success is 
unknown . There must be some other factor or factors that affect moti­
vation. Possibly, motivation is a separate entity and, at least for 
the present, is impossible to quantify. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
This study was done in a small area o f  just one county in the 
state. The first suggestion for further study presented here, there­
fore, would be to expand the study to include the entire state. This 
would give results that would be more appropriate for analyzing a 
national program. Another item o f  importance to all governmental pro­
jects is cost . The question of how costs o f  the WIN program compare 
to the benefits o f  such a program must eventually be answered. I f  the 
costs of the WIN program are greater than those o f  the MDTA program 
while the benefits remain about the same, it would be wise to invest 
more money into the program with the better benefit-cost ratios. A 
final suggestion for further research is that only trainees that 
graduated after the Talmadge Amendments went into effect be used in 
any future studies. 
APPENDIX 
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN THE SUCCESS RATIOS 
FOR WIN AND MDTA TRAINEES 
Treatment Group WIN MDTA 
Sample Size 100 100 
Mean 1 . 32 1 .42 
Standard Deviation 0 . 94 0 . 91 
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Ratio 
Between Groups 0 . 5  1 0 . 5  0 .58 
Within Groups 170 . 34 198 0 . 8  
Total 170 . 84 199 
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SUMMARY OF STEPWISE LINF.AR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Sample Size 200 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
1. Success Ratio (SR) 1.37 
2. Age (A) 35.62 
3. Number of Dependents (D) 3.4 
4. Number of Years Received Public 
A id Before Training (Y) 3. 54 
5. Number of Years of Employment 
Before Receiving Training (W)a 1.69 
6. Marital Status (M) 1.11 
7. Race (R) 0.58 
8. Sex (S) 0.46 
9. Program Completed (C) 0.50 
a 
Number of years worked were grouped; 0 (under 
1 (1-2 years), 2 (3-9 years), 3 (over 10 years) . 
Variable Entered 
Step Number And Its Sign F Ratio 
1 -Y 3 
2 +A 2 
3 -D 2 
4 +c 1.5 
5 -s 1.5 
6 +M 1.4 
7 -w 1.2 
Variable Number (7) Race, not entered. 
0.93 
16. 94 
1.87 
4.03 
1.14 
0.78 
0.49 
0.5 
0.50 
1 year) , 
R2 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
� I 
i 
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SUMMARY OF STEPWISE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS (Cont .) 
SR = 1 . 39 + O . OlA - 0 .05D - 0 .03Y - 0 . 05W + 0 .09M - 0 . 26S + 0 . 17C 
( 1 .01) ( 1 .4) ( 1 . 35) (0 . 57) (0 . 99) (1 .4) ( 1 . 2) 
2 R = 0 .04 
F = 1 . 2  
t values in parentheses 
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